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A theoretical model is developed in order to examine and explain the growth
and welfare effects of fiscal policies in the pharmaceutical industry. When the
fiscal instrument is a tax over pharmaceutical firms’ profits, R&D by firms
in the pharmaceutical sector results in growth if there is a generic market.
Otherwise, a subsidy over pharmaceutical firms’ profits should be considered to
generate innovation in medicines. In terms of policy implications, our empirical
results suggest that stimulating generic competition in the pharmaceutical
sector is a main instrument to contain costs and promote welfare.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The healthcare sector has been growing over the years and in 2010 ac-
counted for an average of 9.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in OECD
countries (OECD, 2012). Pharmaceutical expenditures are one of the ma-
jor factors behind the growing expenditures in healthcare services, and
stimulating generic competition is seen as one of the main instruments to
contain costs. The price divergence between branded and generic pharma-
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ceutical goods is an important aspect of the public’s growing concern over
rising healthcare costs.
Healthcare is a dynamic sector where innovations take place, and that in-
volves a significant share of countries’ labor force (Bloom, Boersch-Supan.
McGee and Seike, 2011). At the upstream of healthcare demand there is an
array of intensive research intermediate activities such as pharmaceutical,
biotechnology activities, and medical equipment. The pharmaceutical sec-
tor shows high research and development (R&D) spending, a fundamental
driver of companies’ growth. This takes place within a market structure
of an industry that is moderately concentrated and where innovation is
indispensable for economic survival. Pharmaceutical firms must engage in
expensive research with uncertain results in order to find new drugs, but
following approval these are protected by intellectual property rights that
help firms to recover the high costs incurred during the research and de-
velopment process. The role of patents and market size in innovation has
been emphasized in endogenous technological change models, where profit
incentives are the engine of technological progress (Acemoglu and Linn,
2004, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Ashraf and Mohabbat, 2010, Barro, 2013,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Romer, 1990).
This paper relates the growth of the variety in medicines with the elastic-
ity of substitution among them. In generic market, there is a high degree of
substitutability among medicines, while in the branded medicines market
the elasticity of substitution between any two medicines is very low. With
the aim of keeping the pace of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
the government can alternate its fiscal policy between charging taxes over
pharmaceutical firms’ profits if there is a generic market, and choosing to
subsidize pharmaceutical firms’ research if there is a branded market.
With the aim of empirically testing the theoretical model, we use data
from the pharmaceutical sector in the United States for the period between
2000 and 2010. In the empirical analysis we find a strong relationship be-
tween the pharmaceutical generic market and the growth rate of innovation
when a tax rate is charged over pharmaceutical profits. If there is a branded
market, the government should subsidize pharmaceutical firms in order to
keep the pace of innovation and promote welfare. In terms of policy impli-
cations, our results suggest that to promote welfare, governments should
support innovation rather than raise taxes. However, pressure to contain
costs may lead a government to tax pharmaceutical firms’ profits. This
fiscal policy will enhance economic growth and promote welfare only in a
generic medicines market framework. Therefore, patents’ lifetimes should
be flexible enough to assure generic competition in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
related literature on the pharmaceutical industry. Section 3 presents the
SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN DRUGS, INNOVATION, AND FISCAL POLICY 275
pharmaceutical R&D based growth model and discusses the effects of the
fiscal policy on equilibrium and welfare. Section 4 presents an empirical
application of the theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
This section surveys the literature on the determinants of pharmaceutical
firms’ innovation pace, such as market concentration, market size, research
costs, and fiscal policies chosen to foster the pharmaceutical sector’s R&D.
Boldrin and Levine (2008) characterize the pharmaceutical sector as an
example of a schumpeterian industry. According to Schumpeter (1942)
technological innovations are more likely to be initiated by large firms
than small firms in a dynamically competitive environment. They con-
clude that these firms operate under intellectual monopoly that benefits
only the pharmaceutical firms, harming consumers and the progress of so-
ciety due to rent-seeking and redundancy of research in the pharmaceutical
sector. The market power of the pharmaceutical firms is one of the most
highlighted traits of this sector, which has experienced mergers and acquisi-
tions, mainly during the late 1980s and 1990s, contributing to the increase
in industry concentration without consequently creating positive long-term
value (Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson, 2007). Comanor and Scherer (2013)
blame these mergers for the disappearance of firms that conducted frontline
innovations, causing a decrease in the entire industry R&D’s productivity.
Despite this merging trend, Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli (2001)
analyzing the European pharmaceutical industry and comparing it with
other countries, find that the degree of concentration in this industry has
been consistently low. The pharmaceutical industry includes very different
firms, from R&D intensive multinationals to small firms that are special-
ized in sales, and recently there is the expansion of biotechnology firms.
According to Malerba and Orsenigo (2007), the pharmaceutical sector is a
case where competition is similar to a model of patent races. The market
is dominated by incumbents that have warranted revenues in old prod-
ucts and new entrants usually cannot expect to displace the incumbents
and have difficulties in creating their own protected niche. According to
Danzon and Keuffel (2013), the appropriate economic model of the phar-
maceutical industry is either monopolistic competition or oligopoly with
product differentiation, indicating that there is some concentration in the
production of drugs.
Market size for the pharmaceutical sector has been the subject of recent
research. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) focus on the importance of potential
market size and the ability of the pharmaceutical sector to innovate. Their
empirical model finds a positive relationship between the increase in poten-
tial market size for a drug category and the increase in the number of new
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drugs in that same category. Market size increases profits, and technolog-
ical change is then directed toward these more profitable areas. Garber,
Jones and Romer (2006) show that insurance plans reinforce the under-
consumption of pharmaceutical products that are offered under monopoly,
causing static and dynamic inefficiency. This causes the existence of un-
necessary incentives, for pharmaceutical firms’ innovation, which should be
prevented by inserting limits on patents’ lifetimes and on monopoly pricing.
Cerda (2007) analyzes the creation of new drugs in the US pharmaceutical
sector during the second half of the 20th century and relates it to the unin-
terrupted increase in this market size generated by a surge in population.
The increase in population was endogenously determined by the decrease
in mortality rate caused by new drugs and is simultaneously an important
incentive for pharmaceutical firms for developing new ones. Dubois, de
Mouzony, Scott-Morton and Seabright (2011) establish an empirical rela-
tionship between market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical indus-
try. By making potential market size dependent on three different types
of factors, namely: demographic and socio-economic change; the degree of
competition among pharmaceutical companies as well as their strategies
in innovation, cost cuts and customers’ disputes; and, public policies, they
found positive significant elasticities of innovation to the potential market
size.
Research and development (R&D) in the pharmaceutical industry is an
expensive activity and therefore, to be encouraged, requires barriers to en-
try that guarantee that the incumbents are able to cover the costs incurred
while developing new agents. DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski (2003) esti-
mate the cost of research and development for 68 new drugs from a survey
of 10 pharmaceutical firms. They find that these costs have been growing
substantially and tend to change with the degree of R&D uncertainty and
with the stage of the product development life-cycle. Their conclusions
support the introduction of patents over medicines as a way to guarantee
pharmaceutical companies’ profitability. Kremer (2002) concludes that de-
veloping countries’ pharmaceutical market demand generates uncertainty
in a sector that operates with high fixed R&D costs, and low marginal
costs of production which leads to low research directed to cure diseases
common to those countries such as tuberculosis or malaria. Toole (2012)
empirically investigates the contribution of public research to the early
stage of pharmaceutical innovation. He concludes that the flux of knowl-
edge from academic research to the industry may reduce pharmaceutical
firms’ own investments in R&D and therefore reduce innovation costs.
Another strand of literature focuses on the impact and effectiveness of tax
incentives to stimulate innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. R&D has
characteristics of a public good, which justifies fiscal policies to stimulate
innovation. Hall and Reenen (2000) find a unit-elastic response of R&D
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to tax credits in OECD countries. They consider that the use of the tax
system is preferable to a system in which the government finances or even
conducts the R&D program directly. Corchuelo and Mart´ınez-Ros (2009)
conclude that in Spain tax incentives to R&D are effective only to large
firms and those in high-technological intensity sectors. Busom, Corchuelo
and Mart´ınez-Ros (2012) go one step further by comparing tax incentives
to subsidies as policy instruments to stimulate R&D and comparing them
with the protection of intellectual property rights. They conclude that,
provided there is protection of intellectual property, small and medium
size firms are more likely to use tax incentives than subsidies to stimulate
innovation, while large firms show ambiguous effects. Rao (2011) analyzes
the effect of fiscal incentives on R&D, and concludes that the introduction
of a global health tax credit in the United States would unlikely result in
significantly more or better overall health R&D. Yin (2008) also studies
the impact of political incentives, namely, the relationship between the
tax incentives introduced by the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) and the rate of
pharmaceutical R&D in terms of new clinical trials. His results indicate
that ODA had a significant impact on rare diseases drug development.
The author maintains that tax credits can stimulate stocks and flows of
pharmaceutical R&D but that the effectiveness of this policy depends on
revenue potential of the specific markets. Therefore, small markets require
larger tax credits or even additional policies.
The present paper relates market characteristics of the pharmaceutical
industry, branded and generic pharmaceutical market, with the introduc-
tion of taxes and subsidies to R&D and their effects on the growth rate of
innovation in medicines and welfare.
3. THE MODEL
The theoretical model follows Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter 3),
but we go one step further analyzing the degree of substitutability among
medicines in the pharmaceutical sector, and how optimal fiscal policy can
enhance economic growth and promote welfare depending on the degree
of substitutability among medicines. We assume three types of economic
agents: patients, healthcare providers, and producers of pharmaceutical
drugs. We start by analyzing the behavior of each group of agents sepa-
rately, and then examine the effect of fiscal policy on the equilibrium and
welfare.
3.1. Patients
Consider a representative patient who maximizes the following utility
function from healthcare consumption,
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U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(ct)dt, (1)
where the instantaneous utility function is a continuous and differentiable
function with partial derivatives U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. This concave utility
function is presented under a simple logarithmic specification: U(ct) =
ln ct. Consumption is a composite variable defined as follows,
ct =
(∫ nt
0
mαtjdj
)1/α
, 0 < α < 1. (2)
In Equation (2), mtj corresponds to consumption of each medicine j at
time t and α to the weight each medicine has in aggregate consumption.
Patients love variety concerning medicines (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). The
total set of medicines in the economy is given by the interval [0, nt]. There
is constant elasticity of substitution between any two medicines, ε, such
that ε = 11−α .
The maximization of (1) allows us to determine the growth rate of con-
sumption of healthcare,
c˙
c
= r − ρ, (3)
where r is the real interest rate and ρ corresponds to the rate of intertem-
poral preference.
In this economy there are two sectors of production, a healthcare service
sector perfectly competitive, and a pharmaceutical sector that operates
under monopolistic competition.
3.2. Healthcare Providers
Healthcare providers provide a treatment service, Tt, that employs hu-
man capital, LT
1, and a set of medicines, mj . The treatment service is
provided as follows:
Tt = L
1−α
T
∫ n
0
mαtjdj. (4)
In Equation (4) technological progress is represented by an increase in the
variety of medicines, n. Assuming the symmetry condition,
∫ n
0
mαtjdj =
nmα, Equation (4) becomes:
Tt = L
1−α
T n
1−α (nm)α = L1−αT nm
α. (5)
1Human capital is usually identified with the characteristics of the worker who con-
tributes to his productivity, and therefore is more appropriate in dealing with sectors
that are devoted to innovation.
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Taking the treatment service, Tt, as the numeraire, profits in this sector
are given by:
ΠT = L
1−α
T
∫ n
0
mαtjdj − wTLT −
∫ n
0
pjmtjdj. (6)
In Equation (6), total revenue corresponds to the generated income, and
total cost is the sum of human capital costs, and the cost of medication.
From the maximization of profits the price of medicine j is:
pj = αL
1−α
T m
α−1, (7)
and the wage rate is:
wT = (1− α)L−αT nmα. (8)
3.3. Pharmaceutical Sector
At the upstream end of the healthcare providers there is the pharmaceu-
tical sector where each firm owns a patent over a medicine, mj , to produce
it. To create a new medicine a firm has to employ LM units of human
capital, such as:
n˙ =
n
a
LM , (9)
with n the number of medicines available in the economy, and 1/a the
productivity of innovation.
From the maximization of profits the price of medicine j is:
pj =
wM
α
, (10)
and the quantity produced is:
mj =
(
wM
α2L1−αT
) 1
α−1
. (11)
The pharmaceutical firm’s profits become:
Πj = α
1+α
1−αLTw
α
α−1
M (1− α) . (12)
3.4. Equilibrium Factor Prices
At the steady state, the innovation growth rate, g, is constant, such that
g = n˙n . Assuming the symmetry condition Πj = Π, and mj = m, and
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substituting (11) in Equation (5), we obtain:
Tt = LTnα
2α
1−αw
α
α−1
M . (13)
Log-differentiating this expression, we calculate the available treatments’
growth rate as:
T˙
T
=
n˙
n
+
(
α
α− 1
)
w˙
w
. (14)
Agents are indifferent between working in one or the other sector, and thus
the wages paid by healthcare providers and by pharmaceutical firms are
identical. Equating Equation (8) to Equation (11), we obtain the human
capital market equilibrium wage rate:
w = (1− α)1−α n1−αα2α. (15)
There exists a tax rate over pharmaceutical firms’ profits, τ , that is constant
and known by all agents. This tax is transferred to consumers in the form
of a lump-sum transfer. Free-entry conditions in the pharmaceutical sector
impose a positive rate of innovation:∫ ∞
0
e−rt (1− τ) Πjdt = wa
n
, (16)
where r is the interest rate that is constant at the steady state, and therefore
Equation (16) can be rewritten as
(1− τ) Πj
r + αg
=
wa
n
. (17)
Now, using Equations (3), (9), (12), and (15), equation (17) simplifies to
g =
α (1− τ)L/a− ρ
1 + α (1− τ) . (18)
It follows from equation (18) and the previous assumptions on the param-
eters the following comparative statics:
∂g
∂L
> 0, and
∂g
∂(1/a)
> 0,
the greater the human capital (i.e. the higher L) and the greater the
productivity of innovation (i.e. the higher 1/a), the higher the growth
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rate. Conversely, an increased rate of intertemporal preference lowers the
rate of innovation.
∂g
∂ρ
< 0.
This result stems from the fact that a higher time preference increases the
firm’s opportunity cost of not immediately innovating. With regard to the
tax rate, we obtain that the greater the tax rate (i.e. the higher τ), the
lower the growth rate, i.e.:
∂g
∂τ
< 0.
The more elastic is the substitution between any two medicines, the higher
is the growth rate, i.e.:
∂g
∂ε
> 0.
The intuition behind this result is that the more the medicines become sub-
stitutes, the greater the incentive for the pharmaceutical firm to innovate
in order to have the new, and exclusive medicine’s monopoly.
3.5. Welfare Analysis
Finally, we analyze the effects on welfare of the fiscal policy under anal-
ysis. Welfare is equal to the utility level that the representative agent can
get with the fiscal policy. Profits are not incorporated into welfare because
profits from the pharmaceutical sector are zero due to the free-entry con-
dition. Profits of the firms are strictly positive and it is assumed that all
of the firm’s income is redistributed to the agents via wage payments and
lump-sum transfer of tax revenue.
Rearranging Equation (18), we know that L = ag + (1− α)T/wT . At
the steady state, and assuming that all treatments are provided to patients,
T = c, we have the following steady-state consumption level of healthcare,
c =
L+ aρ
(1− α) (1 + α (1− τ))w. (19)
Using Equations (1), (18), and (19), we obtain the long-term utility level:
U =
1
ρ
[
log
(
L+ aρ
(1− α) (1 + α (1− τ))
)
+ logw0
]
+
(1− α) [α (1− τ)L/a− ρ]
ρ2[1 + α (1− τ)] ,
(20)
and calculate the effect of the tax rate on welfare:
dU
dτ
=
α
ρ2 [1 + α (1− τ)]2 [αρ (2− τ)− (1− α)L/a] . (21)
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Thus, τ is given by:
τ = 2− (1− α)L/a
αρ
. (22)
The tax rate, τ , as given by equation (22), is optimal only if it implies
g > 0. Substituting equation (22) into equation (18) we obtain:
g (τ) > 0⇐⇒ L
a
>
ρ
1− α. (23)
For τ > 0, we verify that:
L/a < 2αρ/ (1− α) . (24)
This result shows that if the government taxes pharmaceutical firms’ prof-
its, the equilibrium growth rate is positive only if ε > 2. The tax rate on
pharmaceutical firms’ profits may promote economic growth when there
is a high degree of substitutability among medicines. Thus, the develop-
ment of a competitive generic medicines market in which medicines are
close substitutes is compatible with a tax rate that enhances growth and
thus promotes welfare. If we are in the presence of a branded market,
i.e. the medicines do not have close substitutes, ε < 2, the alternative to
obtain positive growth is for the government to subsidize pharmaceutical
firms, and the subsidy in this model is given through a tax credit, such as
s = −τ .
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
The data in the present empirical application pertain to pharmaceuti-
cal sector in the United States between 2000 and 20102. Figures 1 and
2 provide a sensitivity analysis of the growth rate under the fiscal poli-
cies for different degrees of substitutability among medicines. Figures 3-6
show the welfare analysis under the fiscal policies for different degrees of
substitutability among medicines.
Figure 1 shows the variation of the growth rate, Equation (20), for values
of τ , and for ε > 2. It is shown that it is possible to raise taxes and obtain
the high levels of innovation when there exists high substitutability among
medicines. Thus, this corroborates the model’s analytical result that a
competitive generic medicines market is compatible with a fiscal policy
that enhances economic growth.
Figure 2 shows the sensitivity analysis of the growth rate, Equation (18),
for values of s, and for ε < 2. With subsidies, g, the growth rate of new
2See Appendix for data sources and description.
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FIG. 1.
ρ = 0.037, L = 17008, a = 259, 2 < ε < 2.5
medicines rises when ε is close to 2 and the subsidy is high. When there
is a low degree of substitution between any two medicines, the innovation
growth rate is not very sensitive to the fiscal policy. Comparing Figure 1
with Figure 2, it is clear how important the development of a competitive
generic medicines market is for achieving higher levels of innovation in the
pharmaceutical sector.
Figures 3-6 show the sensitivity analysis of the utility level, Equation
(20), for different values of the parameters of the model, τ , s, and ε. Figures
3 and 4 present the welfare analysis when a tax is being charged over
pharmaceutical firms’ profits and there is a high degree of substitutability
among medicines, i.e. ε > 2. Figures 5 and 6 present the welfare analysis
when the pharmaceutical firms are receiving a subsidy and there is a low
degree of substitutability among medicines, i.e. ε < 2.
Figure 3 shows the variation in the level of utility when the profits are
taxed and for ε > 2. Although the welfare decreases with taxes, it is
possible to raise taxes and obtain the highest level of welfare when there
exists high substitutability among medicines.
The sensitivity analysis of welfare with respect to τ and g is shown in
Figure 4. The utility level increases when the growth rate of medicines,
g, is high and τ moves toward its minimum level. Welfare is considerably
more sensitive to the growth rate of innovation than to changes in the tax
rate. The policy implication of this result is that to promote welfare, a
government should promote innovation rather than raise taxes.
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FIG. 2.
ρ = 0.037, L = 17008, a = 259, 1 < ε < 2
FIG. 3.
ρ = 0.037, L = 17008, a = 259,2 < ε < 2.5
Comparing Figures 3 and 4 we conclude that welfare depends more on
the degree of substitutability among medicines than on the tax rate. These
figures show that for high levels of elasticity of substitution, welfare rises
with the innovation rate under any value of the tax rate charged over
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FIG. 4.
ρ = 0.037, L = 17008, a = 259, 2 < ε < 2.5
profits. Again, we conclude that to promote welfare, a government should
stimulate the development of a competitive generic medicines market.
Figure 5 presents variations in welfare with respect to ε and s, when
there is a low degree of substitutability among medicines. Changes in
welfare are more sensitive to changes in elasticity values than to changes
in the subsidy. Nevertheless, Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 4, the long-
term level of utility is significantly more sensitive to changes in the level of
the subsidy than is the innovation growth rate. Comparing the effects of
the two alternative fiscal policies on welfare when controlling for different
levels of substitutability, as shown in Figures 3 and 5, we note that the
long-run level of utility is higher under a subsidy than under taxes.
The sensitivity analysis of welfare with respect to s and g is shown in
Figure 6. Welfare is very sensitive to the innovation growth rate but it is
not very sensitive to the subsidy. Figures 4 and 6 show that to promote
welfare, it is better to give a subsidy to innovation rather than to tax
pharmaceutical firms’ profits. Additionally, we observe that welfare is more
sensitive to changes in the level of taxes than to changes in the levels of
the subsidies.
Our simulation results confirm the model’s analytical results. The de-
gree of substitutability among medicines is determinant for the innovation
growth rate in the pharmaceutical sector. Higher levels of the growth
rate and welfare are possible even in the presence of tax rates over prof-
its, provided there is a high degree of substitutability among medicines.
Our empirical results suggest that stimulating generic competition in the
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FIG. 5.
ρ = 0.037, L = 17008, a = 259, 1 < ε < 2
FIG. 6.
ρ = 0.037, L = 17008, a = 259, 1 < ε < 2
United States pharmaceutical sector is a main instrument to contain costs
and promote welfare.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the implications of different types of pharma-
ceutical markets, generic versus branded markets, for optimal fiscal policies.
The analysis has been performed in the context of an endogenous growth
model with technological change. The government can attribute a subsidy
to research in a pharmaceutical branded market or tax profits in a generic
market. The comparison of the different fiscal policies with respect to their
impact on the innovation growth rate and welfare of the economy in steady
state depends on the degree of substitutability among medicines. The in-
novation rate is lower if instead of taxing pharmaceutical firms’ profits in a
generic medicines market, a government chooses to subsidize pharmaceuti-
cal firms in a branded market. It is also shown that welfare increases with
the innovation rate under any fiscal policy. However, the positive effect
of the innovation rate on welfare is more pronounced under subsidy than
under taxes on profits.
In terms of policy implication, our findings suggest that to promote
welfare, a government should cultivate innovation rather than raise taxes.
However, pressure to contain costs may lead the government to tax phar-
maceutical firms’ profits. This fiscal policy will enhance economic growth
and promote welfare only in a generic medicines market framework. There-
fore, the protection of intellectual property rights should be flexible enough
to assure that there is generic competition in the pharmaceutical sector.
APPENDIX: DATA
The simulations relate to the growth rate obtained in Equation (18) and
to the utility level obtained in Equation (20). These simulations where
performed using data from the pharmaceutical sector in the United States
for the period 2000-2010. The values of the parameters, as well as the
ranges used in the simulations of growth rates and the utility level, were
drawn from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD database). The parameters from the equations of the growth rate
and utility are defined as:
α: The parameter of elasticity of substitution between any two medicines,
ε, being ε = 1(1−α) > 1, 0 < α < 1.
ρ: The discount rate is proxied by the United States “long-term gov-
ernment interest rate”, from OECD database, for the period 2000-2010.
τ : The tax rate is proxied by the United States “taxes on income and
profits” from the OECD database, for the period 2000-2010.
s: The data on subsidies to innovation costs where not available, there-
fore the range of variation for this variable was picked arbitrarily.
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L: Labor force in the healthcare sector is proxied by United States
“total labor force”, from OECD database, for the period 2000-2010 times
the percentage average of “employment in the health and social sectors as
a share of total civilian employment” for the United States from the OECD
Annual Labor Force Statistics for the period 2000-2010.
a: The parameter a is proxied by “business enterprise R&D expendi-
tures in pharmaceuticals at constant prices and PPPs” from the OECD
database, for the year 2000 relative to “Full-time equivalent researchers in
pharmaceuticals” from the OECD database, for the year 2000.
TABLE 1.
Parameter Values
Mean Maximum Minimum
α 0.5 0.99 0.01
ρ 0.037 0.06 0.032
τ 0.13 0.149 0.107
s 0.07 0.10 0.05
L 18028 19402 17975
a 259 - -
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